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JJarifyn M. branch
®erk of the Court

June 27, 1996

Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

Francia v. Health & Tennis
Case No. 960279-CA

Corporation

of

America

Dear Clerk:
This letter serves as a citation of supplemental authorities
pursuant to Rule 24 (i) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On
June 14, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court decided the matter of
Interwest
Construction
v. Palmer, 2 92 Utah Adv. Rpts. 27, 29,
(Utah 1996), a copy attached hereto. In that case, page 29,
lower right hand column, the court stated, "all parties to a
contract may generally exempt themselves from negligence
liability, the language they may use must 'clearly and
equivocally' express an intent to limit tort liability in a
contract itself." It appears to us that this language is
pertinent to the argument contained in our brief at pages 10-12.
Thank you for your assistance in drawing this supplemental
citation to the attention to the members of the court.
Sincerely,

Robe
RHW/ar
Encl:

C:\IN\BALLYS

Interwest
Construction
v. Palmer,
292 Utah Adv. Rpts. 27, 29, (Utah 1996)
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poured the appeal to the court of appeals. We
then granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision affirming the trial court
judgment.
See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886
IN THE SUPREME COURT
P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995). Our present review is limited to
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, a Utah considering whether the court of appeals erred m
holding (I) that our decision m Beck v. Farmers
corporation.
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
Plaintiff and Respondent,
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict
v.
R. Roy PALMER and Val W. Palmer, dha liability arising out of the breach of contractually
defined obligations; and (n) that Thiokol waived
A.H. Palmer & Sons,
its rights to enforce its contract with Interwest.
Defendants and Respondents.
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's
findings of fact The trial court initially detailed
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba its findings by memorandum decision and then
A.H. Palmer & Sons,
by formal findings of fact and conclusions of
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light
v.
most favorable to the trial court's findings. Stale
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures
v. A House <k 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535
Company
and
Fiberglass
Structures (Utah 1994).1
Company, Inc.,
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest
Third-Party
Defendants
a n d entered mto a contract under which Interwest
Respondents.
agreed to build a wastewater treatment facility
for Thiokol.
Interwest
subsequently
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, subcontracted with Palmer for labor and
fka Fiberglass Structures Company of St. materials m connection with the construction of
the facdity. Palmer, m turn, subcontracted with
Paul, Inc.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc.
("Fiberglass Structures"), for the purchase of
v.
three fiberglass wastewater storage tanks for the
Thiokol Corporation,
facility. Palmer's purchase order required
Third-Party Defendant and Petitioner.
Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans
and specifications unless it obtained prior
No. 940616
approval to deviate from them.
FILED: June 14, 1996
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the
treatment facility designated the fiberglass tanks
First District, Cache County
as T32, T33, and T34 and called for the tanks to
The Honorable Gordon R. Low
be budt m accordance with "applicable
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national
ATTORNEYS:
voluntary industry standard governing the
Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt
construction of fiberglass tanks. The tanks were
Lake City, for Interwest Construction
designed to collect wastewater from four smaller
George W. Preston, Logan, and Robert T. tanks located mside the treatment budding by
Wallace, Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & means of a gravity-feed system. Because the
Sons
tanks mside the building were smaller than the
John E. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard three external tanks, the gravity-feed system
and Fiberglass Structures
allowed the external tanks to become only
Anthony B. Qutnn, Mary Anne Q. Wood,
two-thirds full at maximum. Thiokol approved
Richard G. Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for
specifications for the tanks indicating that their
Thiokol
walls would be 1/4 inch thick.
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated
Utah Manufacturers Association
fiberglass panels to the treatment facility site.
The panels were bolted together along vertical
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
seams to create each of the three tanks, and the
tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the
treatment building. The top of each tank was
This opinion is subject to revision before
bolted to the sides, and fill pipes were connected
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
between the three external and the four internal
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
tanks. The three external tanks were completed
Following the trial court's entry of judgment and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial
on a contract dispute m favor of Interwest test that same day, tank T34 burst along one of
Construction ("Interwest") and A.H. Palmer and the vertical seams connecting two of its
Sons ("Palmer"),
Thiokol
Corporation fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2,
l^Thiokop appealed to this court, and we 1989. Thiokol inspected the treatment facility
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
Cite a*
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and notified Interwest that the facility was
substantially complete with the exception of a
few punch-list items, which did not include the
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other
two tanks. The same day, Palmer gave Thiokol
a one-year warranty on all then-installed work.
Thiokol hired an independent consulting
engineer to review the cause of tank T34's
failure, and the consultant recommended that
Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant
was concerned about the strength of the tanks'
vertical panels, among other things, and
recommended increasing the thickness of the
panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design,
to 3/4 inch. However, Thiokol's project
engineer directed the consultant to focus on
fixing the tanks' seams Thereafter, Thiokol
negotiated separately and directly with
Fiberglass Structures tor the repair of tanks T32
andT33 and replacement of tank T34, Thiokol's
involvement was such that the trial court
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures
"jointly constructed the tanks." Specifications
for the modified tanks clearly indicated that they
would have 1/4-inch thick walls and a safety
factor of 6
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and
accepted the repaired tanks on the basis of its
determination that the tanks met its
specifications
On June 13th, Fiberglass
Structures gave Thiokol an extended three-year
warranty at Thiokol's insistence, which
warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but
expressly excluded damage resulting from
modifications to the tanks. Interwest and Palmer
were minimally, if at all, involved in these
negotiations
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the
treatment facility Sometime that month, without
the knowledge of Interwest, Palmer, or
Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the
tanks' filling system from the original
gravity-feed design to an overhead,
high-pressure pump feed.
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured,
spilling its wastewater contents. The trial court
found that the pump feed system allowed the
tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol
employee Given the pumping capacity, there
was an insufficient opening at the top of the tank
to allow for the escape of excess wastewater,
thus causing an uplift pressure which the tank
was not designed to withstand. The overfilling
and consequent uplift pressure caused the tank to
lift up from its concrete base and to split from
the bottom up along the middle of one of the
fiberglass panels, not along a seam as was the
case with tank T34's earlier failure.
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol
withheld $200,000 which it owed to Interwest
on the original contract. That amount included
$93,653 70 which Interwest owed to Palmer.
The instant action began when Interwest sued
Palmer for breach of warranty, negligence,
indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer then
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filed a third-party complaint agamst Fiberglass
Structures, which in turn filed a third-party
complaint agamst Thiokol. Interwest later added
Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment
Thiokol eventually counterclaimed agamst
Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass Structures for
breach of contract, breach of express and
implied warranties, negligence, and strict
liability

After a two-week bench trial, the trial court
concluded in relevant part that (i) it would not
address Thiokol's tort claims because the case
was "entirely controlled by contract", (n) the
NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated
into the contract so as to specify a particular
wall thickness or safety factor for the fiberglass
panels and, therefore, Thiokol could not hold its
suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with
a specific wall thickness and safety factor, (m)
neither Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass
Structures failed to comply with the contract in
any way which caused or resulted in the August
24th failure of tank T33, (IV) Thiokol failed to
prove the cause of tank T33's failure and the
most likely cause was Thiokol's overfilling the
tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the tanks
barred its recovery under any of its suppliers'
warranties Accordingly, the trial court ordered
Thiokol to pay Interwest $200,000, ordered
Interwest to pay Palmer $ Q 3,653 70, and
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals
affirmed and Thiokol's petition to this court
followed
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends
that the court of appeals erred m affirming the
dismissal of Thiokol's tort claims. In addition,
Thiokol claims the court of appeals erred in
holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert
that the modified tanks should have complied
with the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol claims
that each of these issues presents only questions
of law which this court should review
nondeferentially. See State v. Pena, 869 P 2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's
tort claims. In its post-tnal memorandum
decision, the trial court refused to address
Thiokol's negligence and strict liability claims
because it concluded that the case was "entirely
controlled by contract.'* The court of appeals
affirmed, reasoning that because uthe contract
expressly provided that [Interwest and Palmer]
were under a duty to design, construct, and
deliver a product free from defects and suitable
for the purposes for which it was to be used,"
their uresponsibility in tort is . . . exactly
co-extensive with their contractual obligations,"
thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest
Constr , 886 P 2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that
the court of appeals misconstrued our earlier
decision in Beck as establishing the proposition
that u if parties arrange rights, duties, and
obligations under a contract, any cause of action
for breach of those contractually defined
obligations, rights, or duties lies in contract, not
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in tort " Id (citing Beck, 701 P 2d at 799-800).
Although we ultimately reach the result thai
Thiokol's tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokoi
that the court of appeals misapplied our holding
in Beck, In Beck, we addressed whether an
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing allowed its insured to sue the
insurer in tort We held that uin a first-party
relationship between an insurer and its insured,
the duties and obligations of the parties are
contractual rather than fiduciary.'' Beck, 701
P.2d at 800 Because we found no independent
fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay
claims, we further held, "Without more, a
breach of [contractual! implied or express duties
can give rise only to a cause of action in
contract, not one in tort " Id.
Nonetheless, we specifically noted m Beck that
"in some cases the acts constituting a breach of
contract may also result in breaches of duty that
are mdependent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action m tort " Id at 800 n.3
(givmg examples). However, m Beck, we
refused, for a number of policy reasons, see id.
at 798-801, to recognize a tort action in the
context of a first-party insurance relationship.
In the instant case, the court of appeals
assumed on the basis of Beck that language in
Thiokol's contract calling for a product "free
from defects" supplanted any mdependent tort
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver
nondefective products or services. See Interwest
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. But the limitation we
adopted m Beck is not broadly applicable to all
contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred
to a specific relationship between contractmg
parties. Each category of relationships must be
analyzed to determine, as a matter of law and
policy, whether m that setting a party to a
contract owes any tort-type duties to the other
beyond the duties spelled out in the contract.
See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d
413, 417-20 (Utah 1986) (applying analytical
model for determining whether tort duties exist);
see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts §92, at 655 (5th ed.
1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the
nature of the defendant's activity, (u) the
relationship between the parties, and (in) the
type of injury or harm threatened to determine
whether tort obligations are owed m addition to
contract promises).
Thiokoi cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.,
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), as an example of an
instance where we recognized that a tort duty
may exist even when the relationship between
the parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR
Inc., we allowed a clothmg store owner to
pursue a tort claim against a company which
agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm
when the company knew but failed to warn the
store owner that the alarm could be easily
deactivated by criminals. Id. at 434. We
recognized that under those
factual
circumstances, one who undertakes to provide
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services for another owes a tort duty to the other
to perform such services with reasonable care.
Id at 435-37, see Restatement (Second) of Torts
§323 (1965). 2 We explained that "'the
defendant's tort liability is not based upon
breach of contract, but rather upon violation of
the legal duty independently imposed as a result
of what the defendant undertook to do with
relation to the plaintiffs interests.'" Id. at 437
(quoting Carl S Hawkins, Retaining Traditional
Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions,
1981 B.Y.U. L Rev 33, 36).
We agree that a buyer of products or services
may, in some circumstances, assert tort claims
along with breach of contract claims against a
supplier That recognition is nothing more than
an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have
permitted certain actions~for example, products
liability—to include claims sounding m both tort
and contract See Keeton et al , supra, §92, at
660-61
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of
Thiokol's suppliers are necessanly "exactly
co-extensive with their contractual obligations,"
as the court of appeals held. Interwest Constr.,
886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokoi alleged that its
suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent
foreseeable harm to others (negligence) or
manufactured and sold the tanks m a defective
condition that made them unreasonably
dangerous to others (strict liability). Our
decision in Beck does not control whether these
tort claims can coexist with Thiokol's contract
claims. That determination requires a deeper
analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal,
that analysis is unnecessary. We will take a
shorter route and simply assume, without
decidmg, that some tort and contract claims can
coexist m the instant case.
In light of this assumption, we also hold that
the ttfree from defects" contractual provision
cited by the court of appeals is insufficient as a
matter of law to exempt Thiokol's suppliers
from strict tort or negbgence liability. On
grounds of pubbc policy, parties to a contract
may not generally exempt a seller of a product
from strict tort habdity for physical harm to a
user or consumer unless the exemption term "is
fairly bargamed for and is consistent with the
policy underlying that [strict tort] habdity."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §195(3)
(1981). While parties to a contract may
generally exempt themselves from negligence
Lability, the language they use must "'clearly
and unequivocally' express an mtent to limit tort
habdity" in the contract itself. DCR Inc., 663
P.2d at 438; see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §195 cmt. b (1981). Without such an
expression of mtent, "'the presumption is
against any such intention, and it is not achieved
by inference or implication from general
language such as was employed here.'" DCR
Inc., 663 P.2d at 437 (quotmg Union Pac. R.R.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914
(Utah 1965)).
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Applymg these principles to the instant case
Accordmgly, we hardly see how a contractual
promise to provide a product "free from and assummg that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort
defects" amounts to an exemption from tort duties which they breached, we hold that
liability, especially when we have refused to Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same reason
enforce very detailed and thorough exculpatory that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to
clauses that presented a much closer case for prove that any defect m the design or
exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at manufacture of tank T33 proximately caused the
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's August 24th failure. The trial court specifically
strict liability and negligence claims were not noted contrary testimony on causation: namely,
precluded by the existence of a contract which that Fiberglass Structures failed to properly
contained a promise that Interwest and its design, engineer, manufacture, or test the tanks
subcontractors would supply products ufree from and that these failures contributed to the failure
defects " We thus disapprove of the reasoning of tank T33 However, the trial court ruled
employed by the court of appeals to affirm the against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim
because it found that Thiokol caused the August
trial court's decision.
We now address Thiokol's negligence and 24th failure by overfilling tank T33. We read
strict liability claims on the merits. u To recover this as a factual determination that Thiokol's
for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the misuse of tank T33 exceeded the fault, if any, of
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the its suppliers Otherwise, the trial court would
defendant breached the duty, the breach was a have apportioned damages on Thiokol's breach
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and of warranty claim See Interwest Constr., 886
there was in fact injury." Jackson v. Righter, P 2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages
891 P 2 d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995): see also on Thiokol's breach of warranty claim).
Accordingly, this finding also defeats
Hunsaker v State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah
1993), Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d 111, 116 Thiokol's strict liability and negligence claims,
(Utah 1991); Williams v Melb\, 699 P 2d 723, because they are premised on the same conduct
726 (Utah 1985) To recover on a strict liability and resulted in the same alleged damages as the
theory agamst a seller engaged m selling breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co.
products of the kind at issue, a plaintiff must v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, Inc , 619 P 2d 306, 312
prove (i) that the product v.as unreasonably (Utah 1980). We thus disapprove of the
dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, reasoning employed by the court of appeals to
(n) that the defect existed at the time the product affirm the trial court's ruling but affirm the
was sold, and (in) that the defective condition result reached by both courts.
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Lamb v B&B
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court
Amusements Corp , 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah of appeals erred in holdmg that Thiokol waived
1993); see also Mulhenn v Ingersoll-Rand Co., its rights to enforce the terms of its original
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W
contract with Interwest with respect to the
Hahn, Inc \. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, repaired tanks Thiokol insists that its original
158 (Utah 1979), Restatement (Second) of Torts contract with Interwest incorporated the
§402A (1965); Keeton et al., supra, §103.
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69, a national
Assuming, without deciding, that Thiokors voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and
suppliers owed it tort duties which they fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the
breached, it is nonetheless axiomatic that to standard, and therefore the contract, called for
successfully prosecute actions for negligence and a wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch and a
strict liability, the complaining party must prove safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified
that another party's breach of duty proximately tanks had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor
3
caused the first party's injury. See Jackson, 891 of 6 to 1
We first note that the trial court concluded that
P.2d at 1392 (negligence), Mulhenn, 628 P.2d
at 1304 (strict liability), see also Restatement the "NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not
(Second) of Torts §281 (1965). Proof of incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with
proximate cause is also required in breach of sufficient clarity in the contract for the designer
warranty actions, which may sound in either and manufacturer to be aware of their
contract or tort Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., application: specifically with respect to wall
697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985); Mulhenn, 628 thickness and safety factors."
The court of appeals, in turn, initially
P.2d at 1304, Hahn, 601 P.2d at 159.
"Proximate cause is 4ttthat cause which, in affirmed the trial court's finding that there was
natural and continuous sequencef] (unbroken by no breach of contract because Thiokol's
u
an efficient intervening cause), produces the suppliers built and supplied the tanks m
injury, and without which the result would not accordance with the terms of the contract."
have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. The court of
that necessarily sets m operation the factors that appeals then began its waiver analysis. The
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker, court first noted, without analysis, that the
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alteration m NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall
original) (quoting Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46 thickness dimensions and a safety factor of 10 to
(quoting State v Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 1 and that the tanks did not meet these alleged
requirements Id at 97 & nn.6-7. Then the
fl.3 (Utah 1984))),
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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court of appeals concluded that even if the
contract incorporated the NBS standard, Thiokol
had waived its right to msist that the tanks
conform to the wall thickness and safety factor
the standard allegedly required. Id at 98 The
court reasoned that because Thiokol approved
Fiberglass Structures' proposed design for
remedying the defective tanks, supervised their
reconstruction, "and accepted the tanks although
aware that they were not constructed in
accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol
waived its right to claim that the modified tanks
were deficient because they failed to meet the
design or construction specifications allegedl>
incorporated into the original contract. Id
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals'
waiver analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny
because (1) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was a
material term of the contract which cannot be
waived, and (n) an intentional waiver did not
occur because Thiokol never knew the tanks did
not meet the NBS/PS 15 69 specifications until
after the August 24th failure; and (in) b>
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and
replace the three tanks after the fust failure on
April 30th, Thiokol was merely permitting that
supplier to cure its deficient performance, and
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate
Thiokol's rights to demand full performance
under the original contract. Thiokol notes that if
left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by
deterring contracting parties from attempting to
cure defective contract performance.
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol
and assumed by the court of appeals that the
contract incorporated minimum wall thickness
dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard.
Thiokol concedes that the tnal court expressly
found that the contract did not incorporate such
requirements but claims that the court of appeals
found that it did. Thiokol contends that the court
of appeals could do so because whether the
original contract incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69
standard presents a question of law which an
appellate court can correct without giving
deference to the tnal court's findings and
conclusions.
However, both Thiokol and the court of
appeals have misconstrued the issue m this case.
We do not read the tnal court's finding as
rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 15-69
standard mto the contract, but as a fmdmg that
the standard did not mandate tank walls thicker
than 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1 so as
to make these required terms of the contract.
Our reading is supported by the fact that the
tnal court did consider whether tank T33 met
NBS/PS 15-69's unambiguous requirement that
"all layers shall be overlapped a minimum of 1
inch" but found that Thiokol had not pro\en the
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note
3.
As we set forth below, under our reading, the
tnal court's fmdmg that the contract's reference
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to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate
wall thickness or safety factor requirements is a
factual fmdmg which Thiokol has not properly
challenged. Thiokol has therefore failed to meet
its burden on appeal to u 'marshal the evidence
m support of the fmdmgs and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the tnal court's
fmdmgs are so lacking m support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous."" Hall v.
Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d
1024, 1028 (Utah 1995) (quoting A House &
1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4) (additional
citation omitted). uAbsent such a showing, we
4
assume[ | that the record supports the fmdmgs
of the tnal court and proceed to a re\iew of the
accurac} of the lower court's conclusions of law
and the application of that law in the case.'" Id.
(alteration m onginal) (quoting/4 House & 1.37
Acres, 886 P 2d at 538 n.4).
We first clanfy the standard of review for
interpretation of a contract. Determining
whether a contract is ambiguous presents a
threshold question of law, which we review for
correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v.
Pioneer Oil <k Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770
(Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v.
Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a
contract is unambiguous, a tnal court may
interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we
review the court's interpretation for correctness.
Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation because of
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at
108 (quotmg Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is
found to be ambiguous, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. Id.
Determining the meaning of a contract by
extrinsic evidence generally presents questions
of fact for the tner of fact, whose fmdmgs we
review deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at
358; see also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah EHv.
of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725
(Utah 1990); John D. Calaman & Joseph M.
Penllo, Contracts §3-14 (3d ed. 1987).
Applymg the foregoing rules, we first look to
the four corners of the contract itself to
determine whether it is ambiguous. We conclude
that while the contract unambiguously referred
to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term
requiring the tanks to conform to the "applicable
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69" made the
precise meaning of the performance mtended by
the parties ambiguous. "Applicable" is defined
as "(f]it, suitable, pertinent, related to, or
appropnate; capable of being applied." Black's
Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed. 1990). The word
"applicable" necessanly implies that (l) all the
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69 apply; (u) some
requirements apply while others do not; or (111)
none of the requirements apply. We must
therefore review the NBS standard to determine
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whether any of its provisions unambiguously
mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a
safety factor of 10 to 1
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals
that the standard does not unambiguously
mandate a particular wail thickness or safety
factor for the tanks. The standard spans eighteen
pages and covers materials, laminate properties,
round and rectangular ducting, reinforced
polyester piping, reinforced polyester tanks,
inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6
of the standard states, tt[M]inimum wall
thickness shall be as specified in the tables
, but m no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 mch
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating
conditions." Turning to table 7, which specifies
minimum wall thicknesses for vertical
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find
that the table does not mclude dimensions for
tanks greater than 12 feet in diameter, and tanks
T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in
diameter Table 7 also notes that its figures are
u
[biased on a safety factor of 10 to 1
and a
liquid specific gravity of 1 2." The NBS
standard does not mclude a formula for
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different
sizes than those included in table 7, for different
safety factors, or for liquids with different
specific gravities.
Moreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS
standard does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1
safety factor is "the recognized industry"
standard, contrary to the unsupported assertion
of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886
P.2d at 97 n.6, or that this safety factor is
required in all fiberglass tanks. Other tables m
the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and flanges
are based on different safety factors, and we
have found no formula or recommendation
regarding selection of a mandatory safety factor.
Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as
merely stating the assumptions upon which its
wall thickness specifications for standard-sized
tanks rest.
In short, the word "applicable" in the
contract, coupled with the lack of specificity
withm the NBS standard, renders the contract
ambiguous with respect to the thickness of the
tank walls and a specific safety factor without
resort to extrinsic evidence The trial court
apparently also found the contract provision
ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration of
extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's
meaning. Whether the standard mandated a
mmimum wall thickness and a safety factor of
10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial. After
hearing the evidence, the trial court found as a
matter of fact that the contract, as drafted by
Thiokol, did not impose the mmimum wall
thickness and safety factor requirements that
Thiokol claims were mandated by the NBS/PS
15-69 standard.
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's factual finding before
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the court of appeals, and so that court should
have presumed that the trial court's fmdmg was
correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate
court does not "'set aside the trial court's factual
findings unless they are against the clear weight
of the evidence or [the appellate court] otherwise
reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.'" Sweeney Land Co. v.
KimbalL 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Western Kane County Special Serv.
Dist. No I v. Jackson Cattle Co , 744 P.2d
1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). "This standard of
review applies equally to the Court of Appeals."
Id.; see also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals court
should have deferred to the trial court's factual
finding regarding the meaning of the contract m
light of its facial ambiguity and should have
presumed the correctness of the fmdmg, given
Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on
appeal.
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals'
waiver analysis was irrelevant and superfluous
because it proceeded from an incorrect factual
assumption. In contrast to the court of appeals,
the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69
standard did not mandate a minimum wall
thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a safety factor
of 10 to 1. A contracting party cannot be said to
waive a term that was never part of the contract.
Because the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not
mandate a particular wall thickness or safety
factor, Thiokol could not waive these "terms."
However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol
cannot now claim that its suppliers failed to
adhere to these "terms" and therefore breached
their contracts.
Accordmgly, we are left with the trial court's
factual fmdmg that "the tanks were built
pursuant to the design specifications mandated
by Thiokol m the contract," and the court of
appeals' affirmance, based on that fmdmg, of
the trial court's conclusion that there was no
breach of contract. Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d
at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of that portion
of the court of appeals opinion which held that
Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of
its original contract with Interwest but affirm
that court's conclusion that there was no breach
of contract.
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with
Interwest did not preclude Thiokol's claims for
negligence and strict liability but that those
claims fail as a matter of law because Thiokol
caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We
also hold that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's
breach of contract claim, because the contract
provision the court of appeals found Thiokol to
have waived did not mandate a minimum wall
thickness greater than 1/4 mch or a 10 to 1
safety factor as Thiokol claims. However, we
affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that
Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract.
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge
Hardmg concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's
opmion.
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Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the
result
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon
does not participate herein; District Judge Ray
M Harding sat.

1. These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court
of Appeals' opinion in this case For a more complete
recitation of the facts see Interwest Construction v
Palmer, 886 P 2d 92, 94-95 (Ct App 1994), cert
granted sub nom Fiberglass v Thiokol, 892 P 2d 13
(Utah 1995)
2. Section 323 of the Restatement provides
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is
subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the
risk of harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking
Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965) We also
note that manufacturers and suppliers of products may
be subject to other tort duties even though their
products are sold via contract See id §§388-90
(pertaining to suppliers), id §§395-98 (pertaining to
manufacturers), id §402A (pertaining to strict liability
for defective products)
3. Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the
tanks' structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch
rather than the one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69
calls for and that the tensile strength of the tanks was
insufficient However, the trial court specifically
rejected this version of the facts, finding that Thiokol
presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of
these points Thiokol failed to challenge the trial
court's factual findings before the court of appeals
Interwest Constr , 886 P 2d at 96 ("Thiokol does not
challenge the trial court's factual findings ") We
therefore refuse to address them in this opinion
Butterfield v Okubo, 831 P 2d 97, 101 n 2 (Utah
1992) To the extent that the court of appeals recited
the trial court's findings incorrectly, see Interwest
Constr , 886 P 2d at 97 n 7, we vacate that portion of
its opinion
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